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1 Monism and Pluralism
What is color pluralism?
Not the claim that there are a plurality of colors, if such there be. Most philoso-
phers are color monists, and if they are realists, they likely believe that there are a
plurality of colors—that things are blue, yellow, and red, mauve and magenta, and
many other colors, both named and unnamed. Nor is color pluralism the claim that
objects can be multicolored. On the most straightforward understanding of that
claim (not the only one), for an object to be multicolored is for it to have differently
colored parts. But again the monist orthodoxy in the philosophy of color accepts
that if things are colored they can be multicolored in the sense of having differently
colored parts. To bring into focus the distinctive claim of color pluralism, it will be
useful to contrast it with color monism. After all, color pluralism just is the denial
of color monism. Though color monism is the orthodox position in the philosophy
of color, it is rarely held explicitly with its commitments articulated clearly. So let
us begin by examining the claims of color monism.
There are a plurality of colors. Things are blue, yellow, and red, mauve and ma-
genta, and many other colors both named and unnamed. But despite this plurality,
all the colors that we see are, in some sense, generically alike. They are all colors.
Specifically, they are sensible qualities of surfaces, transparent volumes, and radiant
light sources that are perceptually available to sight (or would be if there were any)
and that have a distinctive sensible character—a visible chromatic quality. What
unites the colors that we see, if we do, as being the colors? (For an interesting skep-
tical case against the idea that the colors display the requisite unity see Matthen
1999.)
That there is a kind of unity manifest in a range of sensible qualities is an ancient
idea. The ancients tended to think of a distinctive range of sensible qualities, such
as color or temperature, as arrayed between opposites in order of their respective
similarities to these (for discussion see Lloyd 1966). Thus there are a plurality of
temperatures that we can feel. These are ordered between the extremes of hot and
cold depending upon their similarities to these, in order of how hot or cold these
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temperatures are. Notoriously, Aristotle understands the colors on this model (De
Sensu iii). The colors are visible qualities arrayed between the extremes of light and
dark ordered by their similarities to these. Thus Aristotle understood the hues to
be a proportion of light and dark, a view with Homeric roots (Gladstone, 1858)
that finds few modern defenders other than Goethe (1810). Even if, along with the
early moderns, we reject the ancient view, we can hold onto the idea that the colors
are generically alike. This need not be understood strictly in terms of the related
notions of genus and species. Rather, the colors are generically alike, at least in
part, by virtue of the relations they bear to one another.
So far, we have the idea that there are distinctive ranges of sensible qualities, the
colors prominently among them, that display some unity despite their plurality.
Call such a distinctive range a family of sensible qualities. The sensible qualities in
a family display a unity in virtue of which they are generically alike. This unity is
manifest in the relations the colors bear to one another. Following the ancients, in
the case of the colors, this unity plausibly consists, at least in part, in the similarities
and differences the colors bear to one another. We can accept at least that much,
even if we reject the further ancient idea that the colors are arrayed in order of sim-
ilarity to the extremes of light and dark. The colors are thus plausibly generically
alike at least in the minimal sense of finding a place in a common color-similarity
ordering.
While we have extracted this much from the ancient view, we should be wary
of looking no further. For there are other relations that obtain among the colors.
Moreover, some of these obtain among the colors in virtue of what they are, in
virtue of being the kind of sensible qualities they are (colors as opposed to temper-
atures, say) and having the specific sensible character that they do (a specific shade
of mauve as opposed to a specific shade of magenta, say). Thus, as W.E. Johnson
(1921) observed, colors stand in relations of determination, there are determinable
and determinate colors (for recent discussion see Funkhouser, 2006). Thus red is
a determinable. There are different ways of being red, crimson and scarlet among
them. Colors stand in relations of determination in virtue of what they are. Given
the kind of sensible qualities they are, and given their specific sensible character,
they stand in relations of determination.
Moreover, not only are there similarities and differences among the colors as
well as relations of determination, but the colors also stand in exclusion relations.
Being red, a thing is not green. Being mauve, a thing is not magenta. And again
this seems to be in virtue of what the colors are, the kind of sensible quality they
are with their specific sensible character, visible chromatic qualities.
So in addition to similarities and differences among the colors, perhaps what
unites the plurality of sensible qualities in the chromatic family are relations of
determination and exclusion. So far, then, we have considered three plausible can-
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didates for relations obtaining among a plurality of sensible qualities in virtue of
which they constitute a family of colors:
1. similarities and differences
2. determination relations between determinables and determinates
3. exclusion relations
For a relation to be a candidate for uniting the chromatic family, it  must, at a
minimum, hold of all and only the colors. Some say that red is like the sound of
a trumpet. Perhaps so. Is this a problem for our first candidate relation? For it
would seem that similarities obtain, not only among the colors, but among the
colors and sounds. So too with differences. Aristotle in De Anima ii maintained
that we experience the difference between colors and sounds. In so doing he was
self-consciously criticizing Plato who maintained, in the Theaetetus, that discrim-
ination was the operation of reason, not sense. Whether or not the difference
between color and sound is apprehended by experience or reason, it remains the
case that differences hold not only among the colors, but among the colors and
other sensory objects as well. So similarities and differences don’t hold among all
and only the colors. That may be so, but what purports to unite, at least in part, the
colors into a family of sensible qualities, are chromatic similarities and differences.
The similarity of red to the sound of a trumpet, and the difference between color
and sound, are not chromatic similarities and differences. Similarly determination
relations obtain among properties other than colors, but it is the structure of de-
terminates and determinables in which they stand that purport to unite the colors
into a chromatic family.
Once we have identified candidate relations that might serve to unite the colors
into a chromatic family, we might ask not only whether they might in fact be so
related but also how they might be. Perhaps the colors stand in some relations in
virtue of standing in others. Even if all of some set of candidate relations genuinely
obtain among all and only the colors, some candidate relations may be explanatorily
prior to other candidate relations.
Thus, for example, the colors plausibly stand in exclusion relations as a conse-
quence of their standing in a structure of determinates and determinables. Red is
a determinable way for things to be in the sense that there is more than one way
of being red. Scarlet is one way for a thing to be red, and crimson is another. So
determinates are ways of being some determinable way. Moreover if something
is scarlet it is not crimson and vice versa. So distinct determinates of red, such as
scarlet and crimson, are distinct ways of being that determinable way. This is why
being scarlet excludes being crimson: the colors stand in exclusion relations as a
consequence of their standing in a structure of determinates and determinables. It
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would seem then that determination relations are explanatorily prior to exclusion
relations.
Similarities and differences on the one hand and the structure of determinates
and determinables on the other are themselves importantly related, though it is a
substantive and controversial issue which, if any, is prior to the other. Thus, for
example, the structure of determinates and determinables can be represented by
the geometry of the color space (see Hilbert and Kalderon 2000 and Funkhouser
2006). Points in the color space represent utterly determinate colors (colors for
which no other color is a determination), and determinable colors are represented
by regions of the color space. Moreover, that a color is a determinate of a deter-
minable, as scarlet is of red, is represented by the region of the color space associ-
ated with the determinate color being a subregion of the region associated with the
determinable color. And two colors are codeterminates of a determinable if they
are associated with nonoverlapping subregions of the broader determinable region.
No doubt it is possible, at least in principle, to fully represent the structure of de-
terminates and determinables among the colors in terms of the geometry of the
color space. However, it is doubtful whether this fact, by itself, establishes the fur-
ther claim that the colors stand in the structure of determinates an determinables
because of the similarities and differences between them. Consider the color space.
Within it there is a dragon-shaped region coiling throughout that space without
quite filling it. It is doubtful whether there is a color determinable correspond-
ing to the dragon-shaped region. So it is not the case that for every region of the
color space there is a color determinable that corresponds to it. So we cannot
identify color determinables with arbitrary regions of the color space. If color de-
terminables are regions of the color space, nonetheless, as they would be if color
similarity and difference were explanatorily prior to the structure of determinates
and determinables, they must be distinguished regions of that space. The challenge
to the claim of explanatory priority is to specify these distinguished regions purely
in terms of color similarities and differences.
It is possible, at least in principle, to represent the structure of determinates
and determinables among the colors in terms of the geometry of the color space.
Another reason for doubting that this fact, by itself, suffices for the explanatory
priority of color similarities and differences is that it is consistent, as well, with
the reverse explanatory priority. Suppose that colors are similar or different from
one another because of the relations of determination in which they stand. It would
be no surprise that determinates and determinables could be represented by the
consequent relations of color similarity and difference that they give rise to. So
a representation of the structure of determinates and determinables in terms of
the geometry of the color space is consistent with the relations of determination
having explanatory priority.
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So far, we have the idea that there are distinctive ranges of sensible qualities,
the colors prominently among them, that display some unity despite their plural-
ity. Such a distinctive range is a family of sensible qualities. The sensible qualities
in a family display a unity in virtue of which they are generically alike. This unity
is manifest in the relations the colors bear to one another. Plausibly, these include
similarity and difference, determination, and exclusion relations, and perhaps oth-
ers. Moreover, it is an open question what the precise explanatory relationship is
between these relations. Despite these open questions, we should, by now, have a
reasonably clear understanding of the notion of a family of colors.
Now that we have a clear if not distinct notion of a family of colors, we are in a
position to define color monism:
Color Monism: There is one and only one family of colors
Color monism presupposes realism about the colors. Consider color eliminativism,
understood as the view that nothing is or could be colored. If color eliminativism
is true, then there are no colors. And if there are no colors, there are no families
of colors. And if there are no families of colors it is not the case that there is one
and only one family of color qualities. So color monism presupposes realism about
the colors. If we hold fixed this presupposed color realism, then color pluralism
is the denial of color monism. Since we are presupposing color realism, we are
presupposing that things are colored. Moreover, the colors of things are related
to one another in such a way that colors are generically alike. The color pluralist
concedes to the monist that there is a unity to a plurality of colors displayed in
the relations of similarity and difference, determination, and exclusion in which
they stand. And in virtue of standing in these relations these colors constitute
a family of sensible qualities. The color pluralist merely denies that there is one
and only one family of colors. Their pluralism consists in their conviction in there
being a plurality of families of colors. According to color pluralism, then, things are
multicolored, not merely in the straightforward sense of having differently colored
parts, but also in the sense of instantiating colors from different chromatic families
(how this is so much as possible will become clear in subsequent section).
Why believe that there is a plurality of families of colors? Why depart from the
monist orthodoxy? As we shall see in the next section, color pluralism is motivated
as a response to the problem of conflicting appearances. The problem of conflict-
ing appearances is a puzzle or aporia at the heart of the Manifest Image of Nature.
It is less a conflict between the Manifest Image of Nature and its Scientific Im-
age (see Sellars 1963), than a conflict or incoherence within the Manifest Image of
Nature itself. If the pluralist is right in contending that the aporia is only resolved
by denying color monism while retaining the monist’s presupposed realism, then
color monism is not only false but incoherent.
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2 The Argument from Conflicting Appearances
The label “color pluralism” was independently introduced by Mizrahi (2006) and
Kalderon (2007). The doctrine so labelled has antecedents, both ancient and mod-
ern. Thus Kalderon (2007), following Burnyeat (1979), attributes this doctrine to
Heraclitus. And, as we shall see, many contemporary philosophers are committed
to color pluralism, even if they have never used that label (it is, at the very least,
entertained by Harman 2001). The doctrine of color pluralism, that there is more
than one family of colors, however it is labelled, is invariably introduced as a reso-
lution of a puzzle or aporia. Indeed the argument for color pluralism is a variant of
the argument from conflicting appearances where the allegedly conflicting appear-
ances are chromatic appearances. (On the argument from conflicting appearances
see Burnyeat 1979; Annas and Barnes 1985.)
A schematic representation of the puzzle is both useful and misleading. It is
useful in that it allows one to clearly see the alleged inconsistency at the heart of
the puzzle. However, it is in one important respect misleading. We will return to
the way in which it is misleading when we are in a better position to appreciate
this.
At the heart of the puzzle is three seemingly inconsistent claims that can be
schematically represented as follows:
1. Variation: o appears F to S and o appears G to S 0
2. Incompatibility: Nothing is both F and G
3. Veridicality: The F-appearance and the G-appearance are both veridical
“o” is a schematic letter whose permissible substituends are singular terms, be they
names or definite descriptions, denoting colored objects. “F” and “G” are schematic
letters whose permissible substituends are color predicates. Finally, “S ” and “S 0”
are schematic letters whose permissible substituends are singular terms denoting
subjects of perception. Following a taxonomy that goes at least as far back as the
Theaetetus, S and S 0 can be different perceivers from the same or different species,
or they can be the same perceiver in different circumstances of perception.
Consider, then, the putative inconsistency. By Variation, o appears F to S and o
appears G to S 0. By Veridicality, The F-appearance and the G-appearance are both
veridical. So o is both F and G. But that is straightforwardly inconsistent with
Incompatibility, the claim that nothing is both F and G.
It would seem, then, that in order to avoid this inconsistency, at least one of
Variation, Incompatibility, or Veridicality would have to be denied. Thus, color elimi-
nativists avoid the puzzle by denying Veridicality (see, for example, Hardin 1993 on
the location problem for the unique hues; for more recent discussion see Gatzia
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2010). If nothing is or could be colored, then none of the color appearances that
normal human perceivers enjoy are veridical. So there is no way for Variation and
Incompatibility to conflict.
How does color pluralism avoid the conflict betweenVariation, Incompatibility, and
Veridicality? Unlike the color eliminativist, the pluralist retains the commitment to
Veridicality. The color pluralist thus retains the realism presupposed by the color
monist. Instead, the pluralist denies Incompatibility.
Before seeing how the denial of Incompatibility leads to color pluralism, let’s first
consider how this is so much as possible. After all, Incompatibility seems, at first
blush, to be merely a consequence of exclusion relations obtaining among the col-
ors, and we have conceded that exclusion relations are plausible candidates for be-
ing, in part, what unites the colors as a family of chromatic qualities. Does denying
Incompatibility commit one to denying that red excludes green, that being mauve ex-
cludes that thing from being at the same time magenta? (For an intriguing thought
experiment that supports these latter possibilities see Harman 2001.) The plural-
ist maintains that one can deny Incompatibility without denying that exclusion rela-
tions obtain among the colors or denying even that exclusion relations are plausibly
among the relations that unite the colors into a family of chromatic qualities. Re-
call, the candidate relations that unite the sensible qualities into a family obtain
among all and only such qualities. Exclusion relations hold only within a family of
colors. If mauve and magenta belong to the same chromatic family, then being
mauve excludes being at the same time magenta. But this has no consequence for
qualities outside that chromatic family. Something can be mauve and loud, say, or
magenta and demure. Now suppose, the pluralist invites us to imagine, that there
are plurality of families of colors. Since exclusion relations hold only within a fam-
ily of colors, then while a determinate color from within a family will exclude all
other determinate colors in that family as well as all color determinables for which
it is not a determination, it will not exclude colors from distinct families, just as
mauve does not exclude being loud, or magenta being demure.
According to the ancient taxonomy, S and S 0 can be different perceivers from
the same or different species, or they can be the same perceiver in different cir-
cumstances of perception. Consider, then, what is surely the strongest argument
for color pluralism, the argument from conflicting appearances constructed on
the basis of interspecies perceptual variation (see, inter alia, Bradley and Tye 2001;
Byrne and Hilbert 2003; Mizrahi 2006; Allen 2007; Kalderon 2007). Thus, plausi-
bly, while humans perceive one family of colors, distinct species with color vision,
such as bees and pigeons, perceive distinct families of colors. That these animals
perceive distinct families of colors is made plausible by the fact that not only are
distinct ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum visible (some birds and insects
can see ultraviolet light invisible to normal human perceivers), but also by the fact
7
that the colors perceived by different species can differ in dimensions of similarity.
Thus pigeon colors, the colors perceptually available pigeons, have a dimension of
color similarity that does not occur in the human color space (Bradley and Tye,
2001; Allen, 2007). If humans and pigeons really do perceive distinct families of
color qualities, then since exclusion relations hold only within families of colors,
something can instantiate both a pigeon color, a color from the family of colors
perceptually available to pigeons, and a human color, a color from a distinct family
perceptually available to humans, all over and at the same time. Thus if the vari-
ation in appearance schematically represented by Variation were the variation in
color appearance between a human and a pigeon looking at the same scene, these
appearances would not conflict, since being a pigeon color does not exclude being,
at the same time, some human color, and so each appearance may be veridical.
The color pluralist while denying Incompatibility, does not deny that colors from
the same family exclude one another, nor that exclusion relations are among the
relations that unite the colors into a family of chromatic qualities. The pluralist
does not deny these things, since exclusion relations obtain only within a family,
and the pluralist maintains that the variation in appearance is due to the visual
presentation of colors from distinct families.
That is the abstract form of the pluralist response to the problem of conflicting
appearances. Earlier I mentioned that the schematic representation of the conflict
at the heart of the problem is importantly misleading. Now is a good time to explain
why. There are a number of importantly different cases of perceptual variation that
fit the abstract scheme. We have just discussed a case of interspecies perceptual
variation, but there are also cases intraspecies perceptual variation, such as the
variation in the location of the unique hues by normal human perceivers (see Hur-
vich et al. 1968; Hardin 1993; Tye 2006a; Cohen et al. 2006; Tye 2006b; Byrne and
Hilbert 2007; Cohen et al. 2007; Tye 2007; Kalderon 2007; for arguments for color
pluralism from intraspecies perceptual variation see Byrne and Hilbert 1997a; Tye
2000; Mizrahi 2006; Kalderon 2007). Whether the variation in appearance holds
between members of the same or distinct species, each type of variation that we
have so far considered is interpersonal. There is, according to the ancient taxon-
omy, in addition, cases of intrapersonal variation, where a scene appears differently
to the same perceiver when viewed in different circumstances of perception. The
way in which a colored object will appear differently to a perceiver in different con-
ditions of illumination would be an example. The abstract representation of the
problem of conflicting appearances obscures these important differences. This is
important since different forms of perceptual variation might be differently ex-
plained, and this might have consequences for how best to resolve the seeming
aporia.
Consider a case of perceptual variation which might give rise to the problem of
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conflicting appearances, but where the seeming paradox is implausibly resolved by
making the pluralist response. Specifically, consider the variation in appearance in-
volved in cases of color constancy (on the importance of constancy phenomena in
the philosophy of perception see Smith 2002; Burge 2010). Suppose you go out to
the garden to pick a tomato to bring inside for washing and slicing. When you see
the tomato outside in broad daylight, the tomato is seen to be a particular shade of
red. As you move from natural daylight to the artificial illumination of the kitchen,
the appearance of the red tomato changes without the tomato itself appearing to
change color. As it travels between these differently illuminated environments, it
appears to remain red, and that particular shade of red, even though it varies in
appearance. This is a diachronic case of intrapersonal perceptual variation. There
are synchronic cases as well (see Arend and Reeves 1986; Cohen 2008). Thus a par-
tially shaded white wall will appear uniformly white, though the shaded part of the
wall appears differently from the brightly lit part of the wall. We might reasonably
describe this difference in appearance by saying that while the brightly lit part of
the wall appears white the shaded part appears gray. If we now reason that since
nothing is both uniformly white and partly white and partly gray to the conclusion
that the variable appearances in synchronic color constancy conflict with the ap-
pearance of a constant color, we have our puzzle or aporia. The pluralist response
to the problem of conflicting appearances gets going by claiming that the differ-
ence between the variable appearances is explained by their being the presentation
of colors from different families. But not all variations in appearance are plausibly
explained in terms of the presentation of different sensory objects. Perhaps the
variation in appearance is best explained, not in terms of what is presented in ap-
pearance, but in terms of the way in which it is presented in appearance. Cases of
color constancy are cases where what’s presented is the constant color and what
varies is the way that constant color is presented. This is Austin’s (1962) insight.
Arguably, he inherits it from Aristotle (see Kalderon 2015). Austin’s use of the Pla-
tonic example of the straight stick looking bent in a refracting medium (Republic x
602c–603a) is precisely a case of shape constancy. And in maintaining that while
the straight stick in water looks like a bent stick it does not look exactly like a
bent stick, Austin is denying that the bent appearance is the presentation of any-
thing bent. What is presented is the constant percept, what varies is the way it is
presented. (See Chisholm 1957; Kalderon 2011b. There are, of course, dissenters.
For recent philosophers who claim that the variable appearances in cases of color
constancy are best understood in terms of what is presented in those appearances
see Noë 2004; Chalmers 2006).
However the variation in appearance involved in cases of color constancy are
to be understood, the methodological point remains: Given that there are dis-
tinct sources of perceptual variation, susceptible to distinct explanations, it is im-
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plausible to suppose that every putative case of conflicting appearances admits of
a uniform solution. It is therefore important to look at psychological and phe-
nomenological details of the particular kind of perceptual variation before decid-
ing which, if any, of Variation, Incompatibility, or Veridicality to abandon. Insofar as
the schematic representation of the problem of conflicting appearances obscures
these differences thereby suggesting that all such cases should admit of a uniform
solution, it is, to that extent, at least, misleading.
3 Metaphysical Accounting
So far we have seen that color pluralism maintains that there are a plurality of fami-
lies of colors, that things are multicolored, not merely in the straightforward sense
of having differently colored parts, but also in the sense that they can instantiate
colors from different chromatic families all over at the same time. Thus something
can have all over and at the same time a human color, a color perceptually available
to humans, and a pigeon or a bee color, a color perceptually available to pigeons
or bees. Moreover, color pluralism is argued to be the best resolution of certain, if
not all, cases of the problem of conflicting appearances. Now that we have a bet-
ter idea what color pluralism is and the reasons for it, let’s clarify the metaphysical
commitments of color pluralism.
First, let’s revisit the pluralist’s alleged commitment to color realism. The plu-
ralist was represented as retaining the color monist’s commitment to color realism.
However, the attribution of realism to the color monist was made on the back of
a particular, and particularly strong, characterization of color eliminativism—that
nothing is or could be colored. This suggests that the very existence of the colors
is impossible and not merely their instantiation. The very existence of the colors
would be impossible if, for example, the conditions for being color conflict—say,
if colors must at once be qualities of the natural environment obtaining indepen-
dently of the perceiver and yet have the qualitative character only possessed by
sensory experience (Boghossian and Velleman 1989; Smith 1990; Boghossian and
Velleman 1991). The denial of color realism can take weaker and stronger forms.
If qualities need not be immanent but can be transcendent, if they can exist in-
dependently of their instantiation, then it is open to claim that while the colors
exist, they are uniformly uninstantiated. This is a weaker form of denial than color
eliminativism, at least as herein represented. This weaker denial of color realism,
where the colors exist albeit uniformly uninstantiated, is consistent with the exis-
tence of a family of uninstantiated colors, qualities that, while uninstantiated, are
importantly related by relations of similarity, difference, exclusion, and determi-
nation. Moreover, this weaker denial of color realism is thus also consistent with
there being a plurality of families of uninstantiated colors. So perhaps color plural-
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ism is consistent with the denial of realism after all. However, the principle reason
for believing in color pluralism was in response to certain cases of conflicting ap-
pearances. Specifically, in certain cases, it is urged that the only way to resolve
the aporia within the Manifest Image of Nature is to deny Incompatibility while re-
taining Variation and Veridicality. But notice, even the weaker form of the denial of
color realism is committed to the denial of Veridcality. If there are no Fs orGs, then
neither the F-appearance nor the G-appearance is veridical. That means that an
irrealist color pluralism, where there are distinct families of uninstantiated colors,
cannot be argued for on the basis of the argument from conflicting appearances.
But if not for that reason, what reason could there be for holding this position? An
irrealist color pluralism, while logically possible, seems unmotivated, at least for all
that has been said (not necessarily all that can be said).
Some readers may have, by now, grown impatient. After all, it might be objected,
color pluralists aren’t the only ones who would resolve the problem of conflicting
appearances by denying Incompatibility. Perhaps Ecumenicism, as the denial of Incom-
patibility has been dubbed by Cohen (2009), is itself ecumenical embracing a variety
of different views, color pluralism merely among them. Thus, for example, Pro-
tagorean relativists and relationalists more generally, deny incompatibility as well
(for an important recent statement see Cohen 2009; other relationalists include, in-
ter alia, McGinn 1983; Thompson 1995; Matthen 1999; Cohen 2004; Matthen 2005).
Suppose that our colors, F and G, are perceiver relative. To be sure being F for S
will conflict with beingG for S . Being F for S will exclude beingG for S—nothing
is both F for S and G for S all over and at the same time. However, being F for S
is perfectly compatible with being G for S 0. It is because the variable appearances
involve the presentation of relational properties with different relata that Incom-
patibility fails. The objection, while prima facie plausible, is unfounded, however.
Protagorean relativism about the colors is a species of color pluralism. According
to the relativist, corresponding to each perceiver is a family of colors potentially
determined by that perceiver in relation with the object and circumstances of per-
ception. While exclusion relations hold within these families, relative colors from
distinct families are compatible with one another. Color relativism is color plural-
ism with the additional commitment to the colors in the plurality of families being
relational in nature. Color pluralism, considered in and by itself, has no such com-
mitment, though it is consistent with it. (We will discuss color relativism further
in subsequent sections.)
The relativist objection has some force, however. While relationalism about
the colors is a species of color pluralism and so no genuine alternative, we have
already seen a non-pluralist denial of Incompatibility. The pluralist denies Incom-
patibility since the variable appearances are presentations of colors from different
families and exclusion relations only hold within a family. But perhaps the variable
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appearances can be explained in another way equally inconsistent with Incompatibil-
ity. Thus, for example, we entertained the suggestion that the variable appearances
in cases of color constancy are explained less by being different presentations of
colors or color-appearance properties than by being different modes of presenta-
tions of the constant color. If this Austinian conception of perceptual constancy is
right, then Incompatibility fails, not because the variable appearances are presenta-
tions of distinct sensible qualities or appearance properties from distinct families,
than because they are different ways of presenting the constant quality. So color
pluralism can understood as the denial of Incompatibility only if we make the fur-
ther assumption that in cases of conflicting chromatic appearances, the variable
appearances are the presentations of different colors.
So far we have discussed color pluralism’s relation to realism and relativism, but
what of reductionism? One central question about the metaphysics of color is
whether or not colors reduce to material or physical properties more generally.
Reductionism is important since it offers the most straightforward answer to how
the colors may be intelligibly realized by material surfaces, transparent volumes,
and radiant light sources, thus reconciling the Manifest Image of Nature with its
Scientific Image, at least with respect to our chromatic experience of the natural
environment. Of course not all philosophers of color are reductionists. And not
all that deny the possibility of reduction deny as well that colors are intelligibly
realized in nature. Thus whereas Hilbert (1987); Byrne and Hilbert (1997a, 2003)
maintain that families of colors are families of anthropocentrically defined physi-
cal properties, most likely reflectance types, color primitivists (such as Campbell
1997; Broackes 1997; McGinn 1996; Yablo 1995; Gert 2008; Allen 2011) deny the
possibility of any such reduction but maintain that the colors may be intelligibly
realized in nature (for a reductionist critique of primitivism, see Byrne and Hilbert
2006). Thus, for example, Yablo (1995) maintains that colors are nonphysical, but
that they can be intelligibly realized by physical things since colors are nonphysi-
cal determinables with physical determinates (in contrast Byrne and Hilbert main-
tain that they are physical determinables with physical determinates). Color prim-
itivism thus contrasts with eliminativist positions such as Hardin’s (1993). Like the
primitivist, eliminativists deny the possibility of reduction, they differ only with
respect to the consequences for the colors being intelligibly realized by the natural
environment. Color pluralism, as characterized here, is neutral between reduction-
ism and primitivism. The colors may be susceptible to physical reduction or not,
but so long as there are a plurality of families of colors, then whether or not they
are reducible to physical properties, color pluralism is true.
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4 Objections and Replies
In this final section, let’s briefly consider the challenges and prospects of color
pluralism as a response to certain cases of conflicting appearances. Some objections
to color pluralism apply to specific forms of color pluralism, others apply to all
forms. Let’s first consider an objection to a specific form of color pluralism, before
considering more general objections.
Consider, then, color pluralism as a response to interpersonal variation in color
appearances between normal human perceivers. Though a common scene viewed
in the same circumstances of perception can present different chromatic appear-
ances to different normal human perceivers, the pluralist maintains that these ap-
pearances do not conflict since these appearances differ only in the presentation of
colors from distinct families and exclusion relations hold only within a family. One
way, not the only way, of understanding this is that the visual sensibilities of the
distinct perceivers select from among the plurality of abundant regularities that
obtain in the natural environment different ranges of properties as being the col-
ors. The color relativist, though no less a pluralist, does not accept the metaphor
of selection and will understand the situation differently. Thus, according to the
Protagorean relativist, colors are determined by the relation between the perceiver,
the object of perception, and the circumstances of perception. So it is the presen-
tation of different families of perceiver relative chromatic qualities that explains
the difference in chromatic appearance of the common scene. Whether or not
the pluralist response to interpersonal perceptual variation between normal hu-
man perceivers is best understood in relativist or non-relativist terms, both forms
of pluralism face a common challenge. While the chromatic appearances enjoyed
by normal human perceivers viewing a common scene in the same circumstances
of perception may differ, if this difference is best explained by the presentation of
colors from different chromatic families, how is a shared color language so much
as possible?
This is an ancient problem for Protagorean relativism. Socrates raises this ob-
jection in the Theaetetus 183a–b (for discussion see Burnyeat 1990). Kalderon (2007)
attempts to respond to this problem by emphasizing that the vast bulk of our color
words represent color determinables. Even very specific color words, such as “burnt
sienna”, represent colors that admit of further determinate shades. Moreover, it
seems that the color words we have for determinate colors (leaving aside the artifi-
cial stipulations of philosophers in speaking of “red17”) are those that are definable
in terms of color determinables. Thus “unique green” represents a determinate
shade of green, but is definable as a shade of green that is not at all bluish and not
all yellowish. But green, bluish, and yellowish are all determinables. The thought is
that while we may not agree about determinate shades given the interpersonal vari-
ation in color appearance—we may disagree whether something is unique green, or
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bluish green, or yellowish green given how it appears in our respective experiences,
nevertheless, we can agree that the perceived object is green. That is to say, there
is sufficient interpersonal agreement about the use of determinable color words to
imbue them with a common sense. Cohen (2009) offers a different way out of the
Socratic difficulty. Cohen combines relativism about the colors with a contextual-
ist semantics for our color words. Color ascriptions are essentially relational. Made
fully explicit the attribution of red to a tomato would be represented as the tomato
being red for S in C, where S is the subject of perception and C the circumstances
of perception. While S and C are not represented explicitly in surface grammar,
context provides the values of these parameters. While contextually specified color
ascriptions may attribute relational properties to their subjects, such color ascrip-
tions do not represent the colors as relational. (For criticism, see Allen 2012; Gert
2012. For an alternative semantics see Egan 2006, 2010.)
While pluralists who argue on the basis of interpersonal variation among nor-
mal human perceivers must explain how their pluralism is consistent with there
being sufficient interpersonal agreement in the use of color words for these to be
genuinely meaningful, other pluralist who argue on a different basis, for example,
on the basis of interspecies perceptual variation, face no such challenge. However,
there is a potential challenge that any variety of pluralism may face, no matter its
precise motivation. The challenge derives from an argument in Shoemaker (2003)
criticizing Hilbert and Kalderon (2000) and variants of that argument have been
presented by Pautz (2006, 2009); Cohen (2009); Pautz (2011).
Let S and S 0 be perceivers with differently structured color experience spaces.
Given their differently structured color experience spaces, S and S 0’s visual sensi-
bilities select families of colors that constitute differently structured color prop-
erty spaces (where the visual sensibility of a perceiver is determined by their visual
system, the nature of the natural environment and their relation to it). Let c be a
property selected to be a color by S and S 0’s visual sensibilities. S and S 0’s visual
experience of c will differ phenomenologically—what it is like for S to experience
c in a given circumstances of perception will differ from what it is like for S 0 to
experience c in the same circumstances of perception. Now suppose further that
the proximate effects of the instantiation of c on S and S 0 are the same. Then the
fact that c’s instantiation elicits phenomenologically different color experiences is
entirely due to further visual processing by their respective visual systems. But it
would seem, then, that the different color appearances enjoyed by S and S 0 in view-
ing an instantiation of c in common circumstances of perception is not explained
by the presentation of colors from different chromatic families, but is explained,
instead, by the further visual processing involved in S and S 0’s perception of c’s
instantiation.
There is no widespread noncollusive agreement about what, if anything, the ar-
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gument establishes. Let me briefly canvas some alternatives.
Kalderon (2011a) suggests that judgments about the causal structure of the pro-
cess of perceiving a color’s instantiation will crucially depend upon the underly-
ing metaphysics of experience. Thus while the proximal stimulation of sensory
transducers will count as a proximal cause of S and S 0’s perception of c’s instan-
tiation on a conception of experience that finds its proper home in a paradigm
inaugurated by the early moderns, proximal stimulation of sensory transducers
will not count as a proximate cause if the perceptual experience of c’s instantia-
tion is instead understood in relational terms, as naïve realists and disjunctivist’s
maintain. (For critical discussion and an application of some of these ideas to the
grammatical case see Longworth 2007.) Pautz (2011, 429 n35) professes not to un-
derstand this claim and offers an alternative understanding of these hypothetical
cases. Their root disagreement, however, seems to concern the metaphysics of ex-
perience. Whereas Pautz (2011) defends a conception of experience at home in the
early modern paradigm (though naturalistically refined and extended), Kalderon,
following Putnam (1994), is deeply skeptical about that paradigm (see especially
Kalderon 2015, Preface).
Cohen (2009) presents a different kind of response to the hypothetical cases first
envisioned by Shoemaker (2003). In Cohen’s hands, such cases poses a challenge
for nonrelational forms of color pluralism while leaving his preferred relational-
ism intact. Some background is useful in understanding Cohen’s argumentative
strategy here. In the previous section I represented color relativism as a species
of color pluralism—as color pluralism along with the further commitment to the
colors in the chromatic families being perceiver relative. This raises a challenge for
the color relativist (Kalderon, 2007). According to the pluralist, Incompatibility is
denied since the variable appearances are explained in terms of the presentation
of colors from different chromatic families. Notice that it is the claim that the
perceived colors are from distinct families coupled with the claim that exclusion
relations hold only within families of colors that resolves the paradox. Moreover,
we needn’t assume that the colors are perceiver relative for this to be so, anymore
than we need assume that mauve and loudness need be relational in order to ex-
plain their co-insantiation. But if, as Cohen (2009) maintains, color relativism is
established on the basis of the argument from conflicting appearances, and the
best resolution of that puzzle or aporia is simply the denial of Incompatibility, then
the possibility of nonrelational color pluralism undercuts the main argument for
Protagorean relativism about the colors. It is against this background that Cohen
argues that while nonrelational forms of color pluralism are susceptible to a variant
of Shoemaker’s argument, relational forms of color pluralism are not. It is difficult
to fully assess Cohen’s case since he does not directly address the arguments of
section 7 of Kalderon (2011a) where the response to Shoemaker is given.
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5 Summary
Colors, if there are any, are sensible qualities that display a unity despite their man-
ifest diversity. This unity is manifest in relations the colors bear to one another,
such as relations of similarity and difference, determination, and exclusion. Chro-
matic qualities that are so related constitute a family of colors. Color monism is
the claim that there is one and only one family of colors. Color pluralism is its de-
nial. Color pluralism is urged on the basis of certain cases of conflicting chromatic
appearances (not all such cases) schematically represented by three inconsistent
claims:
1. Variation: o appears F to S and o appears G to S 0
2. Incompatibility: Nothing is both F and G
3. Veridicality: The F-appearance and the G-appearance are both veridical
In some cases, it is argued that the variable appearances are best explained as the
presentation of colors from different chromatic families (the best such cases in-
volve interspecies perceptual variation), and since exclusion relations hold only
within families of colors, there is no genuine conflict between these variable ap-
pearances and the schematic claim Incompatibility fails, at least in these cases. Like
the monist, color pluralism is best understood as retaining a color realism, at least if
it is motivated by the argument from conflicting appearances by rejecting Incompat-
ibility while retaining Variation and Veridicality—Veridicality would fail if color realism
were false. Moreover, while color pluralism is consistent with color relativism, it
represents a more general view. Color pluralism is also consistent with both re-
ductionism about the colors and color primitivism. The main challenge to color
pluralism consists in variants of an argument due originally to Shoemaker (2003).
There is, at present, no shared consensus on the soundness of such arguments, or
what precisely they establish.
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